The Role of the Courts in the Application of the Requirement of  Residence  for Naturalization by unknown
Indiana Law Journal
Volume 33 | Issue 4 Article 4
Summer 1958
The Role of the Courts in the Application of the
Requirement of "Residence" for Naturalization
Follow this and additional works at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj
Part of the Courts Commons, and the Immigration Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School
Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Indiana Law Journal by an authorized administrator of Digital
Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
wattn@indiana.edu.
Recommended Citation
(1958) "The Role of the Courts in the Application of the Requirement of "Residence" for Naturalization," Indiana Law Journal: Vol. 33:
Iss. 4, Article 4.
Available at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol33/iss4/4
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
unless the unlikely assumption is made that all such cases resulted from
mistakes in expression rather than mistaken insertions. In these latter
cases lawyers seem to have been unaware of the availability of omission
as a method of correction.
The failure to request the omission of words inserted in a will by
mistake frequently appears to have caused the testator's testamentary
intent to be defeated. As the probate objective is to achieve the testa-
mentary intent whenever possible, the legal profession in the United
States should, whenever possible, utilize omission to achieve the probate
objective.
THE ROLE OF THE COURTS IN THE APPLICATION OF THE
REQUIREMENT OF "RESIDENCE" FOR NATURALIZATION
The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 requires aliens seek-
ing naturalization to have "resided continuously" within the United
States for five years before they are naturalized.1 The duty to apply this
concept of "continuous residence" to the facts as they arise falls to the
judiciary, since citizenship, with its accompanying benefits, is a privilege
made available by statute and bestowed by court action with the advice
of the Immigration and Naturalization Service. The recommendation
of the Service may or may not be followed. When an alien contests an
adverse recommendation of the Immigration Service, a trial follows,
with the Service and the applicant as adversary parties. The ultimate
determination of when citizenship should be bestowed rests with the
judiciary.
The legislative inclusion of a requirement of five years of "con-
tinuous residence" has been viewed as a delegation to the courts of the
function of determining in each case whether a petitioner's acts and state
of mind during this period are of the sort which satisfy the broad statu-
tory policy of protecting the interests of United States citizens in the
"Americanization" of future naturalized citizens.
In 1952, Congress codified all prior acts concerning immigration and
naturalization, and added some new provisions, in enacting the Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act. The Act retained the old provisions stating that
continuous absence from the country for over a year, unless within a
specific exception, "shall break the continuity of such residence" as a
1. 66 Stat. 242, 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a) (1952).
NOTES
matter of law. Absence from six months to a year creates a presumption
of a loss of residence, or break in continuity, "unless the petitioner shall
establish to the satisfaction of the court that he did not in fact abandon
his residence in the United States during such period."2 In addition,
Congress specified for the first time that the alien must be physically
present in the United States a total of at least half of the five year period.
The most significant addition made, however, was what appears to
be a radical change in the definition of the "residence." Especially
important is the direction that "residence" be defined in terms of physical
conduct, "without regard to intent."' The problem presented is the
effect of this new definition on the role of the courts in applying the
requirement of "residence."
For many years the courts stated that "residence," as used in the
prior act, was to be equated with domicile. Domicile generally has a
more fixed meaning: the place assigned by law for a person as his
"home."' Domicile depends upon a "domiciliary intent," an intent to
make the locale one's "permanent" or "indefinite" home or dwelling
place.' Theoretically, once this intent is established, plus physical presence
at the place in question, neither the maintenance of continued presence nor
any other contact with the place is essential to the maintenance of domicile
if the subjective "domiciliary intent" is maintained continuously. An
example is United States v. Yatsevitch.6 Having been assigned to work
in England by his American employer, the applicant had to leave this
country shortly after he had arrived here and declared his intention of
becoming a United States citizen. He subsequently spent his full five
years of "residence" living in London. This was due to the fact that his
business was unexpectedly prolonged, lasting the entire period. Before
leaving, he made tentative arrangements to rent a farm here, and while
in London he lived in temporary quarters. Applying a test of domicile,
the court ruled that he satisfied the requirements of "residence," stating
that "throughout his absence his intention to be an American citizen
persisted."7
This case illustrates the wide latitude open to the courts through
their power to confirm or reject the applicant's petition for citizenship on
2. 66 Stat. 242, 243, 8 U.S.C. § 1427(b) (1952).
3. 66 Stat. 170, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(33) (1952).
4. RFSTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 9 (Tent. Draft No. 2, April 22, 1954).
5. This "domiciliary intent" has generally not been deemed essential to a finding
of residence.
6. 33 F.2d 342 (D.C. Mass. 1929).
7. The court emphasized the fact that he was very intelligent and a desirable can-
didate for citizenship. "Why anybody should desire to exclude such a man from citizen-
ship in this country passes understanding." Id. at 343.
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
a ground as nebulous as "residence." Thus the court said in United
States v. Griminger, that only one rule can be deduced from the author-
ities: ". . . that the particular meaning of either [residence or domicile]
is to be broadened or narrowed to give reasonable effect to the purpose
and spirit of the act in which it is used."
The application of the requirement of residence by the courts has
indicated a judicial desire that the alien demonstrate" during this period
of "residence" characteristics consistent with the protection of the inter-
ests of the citizens of the United States.'
However, "residence" is a highly particularized concept. In its appli-
cation to the varying fact situations, even within the single field of
naturalization, it has taken many forms. Those acts required of a man
with 'a large family and much property to establish and maintain a resi-
dence differ from those required of an itinerant bachelor. Thus the
application of the test of residence often depends upon the individual
means by which the alien may evidence, to the satisfaction of the court,
the proper intent, whether it be domiciliary intent, or intent of some
other sort.
The courts indicate that, in general, the intent desired might better
be characterized as an attitude of "good faith" on the part of the ap-
plicant, rather than domiciliary intent. This attitude appears to be
essential to satisfy the requirement of residence."0 The courts verbalize
their conclusions in terms of "intent to reside" or "intent to be a citizen."
However, the actual state of the petitioner's mind throughout the five
year period is obviously beyond discovery. The evidence required by
8. 236 Fed. 285, 287 (N.D. Ohio 1916).
9. In United States v. Martin, 10 F.2d 575 (E.D. Wis. 1925), the court talked
about the two requirements of residence and a declaration of intention "to reside per-
mahently in 'the United States." Martin was denaturalized in this case because he failed
to satisfy the court of the second requirement. The court stated that these two re-
quirements ". . . are relevant to more than mere personal history of the applicant dur-
ing those years; . . . they are intended to support the genuineness of an asserted pur-
pose absolutely to renounce one, and to embrace and bear true faith to another, sov-
ereign allegiance; to aid in proving that attachment to principles, disposition toward
good order and happiness, are real and are likely to be permanent. Because of the
reciprocal rights and obligations subsisting between governments and those within
territorial limits, citizenship, with its allegiance, usually concurs with residence, domicile,
or habitation therein; and, where it does not, there is none the less the feeling that
as a matter of c,il obligation it shoild so concur, thereby, in theory, at least, to enable
enjoyment of rights and the discharge of obligations. These, as suggested, may be re-
spected as elementals implied in the very notions of naturalization-as sovereign re-
quirements exacted in the effort to establish as near as may be equivalence between
native-born and adopted citizenship." (Emphasis added.)
10. Some judges have explained that in giving "reasonable effect to the purpose
and spirit of the act," they must find that the alien seeks citizenship in good faith be-
fore bestowing nationality upon him. See, for example, Petition of Correa, 79 F.Supp.
265 (W.D. Tex. 1948).
NOTES
the courts to prove this mental attitude indicates that, even though the
courts have said they were looking for "intent to reside," they were
actually looking for a subjective attitude of good faith on the part of the
petitioner.
This element of good faith does not involve morality or good char-
acter as such, but seems to be essentially a demonstrated willingness on
the part of the petitioner to share in the burdens as well as the benefits
of United States citizenship.1 It is felt that the maintenance of this
attitude for at least five years serves to protect United States citizenship
from being treated in a superficial way. The courts feel that citizenship
should not be too easy to obtain, and that if the applicant has endured
some inconvenience before being naturalized, other citizens' interests
will be protected from the granting of citizenship to frivolous and
irresponsible persons. Thus in Hantzopoulos v. United Stctes, 2 peti-
tioner and his wife found it necessary to leave this country because of
their poor health. He subsequently had to leave his ill wife in the foreign
country in order to return to the United States in time to save his period
of residence from being forfeited under the statute. The court, in holding
that he had not abandoned his residence by his absence for over a year,
stated: "The very fact that he left his wife sick and confined to her
bed rather than to forfeit his right to be a citizen of the United States is
proof sufficient of his bona fide intention, and it would be inhuman now
to deprive him of the right after he had made that sacrifice."1 8
The problem of residence and the determination of the petitioner's
good faith arise in two circumstances. The first involves the determina-
tion of when a "residence" has been established in the United States. The
second, as in the Hantzopoulos case, is the question of how the continuity
of a residence established in this country may be broken. The factors
involved in each are different. One is a question of the sufficiency of
presence and the other the necessity of the absence. This results in two
different tests, both aimed at determining the degree of the alien's
willingness to accept the burdens of United States citizenship with its
benefits.
The courts, when they are examining the petitioner's presence in this
country to determine the establishment of a residence here, look to his
ownership and use of personal and real property and the location of his
11. See Petition of Correa, 79 F. Supp. 265 (W.D. Tex. 1948) ; United States v.
Ginsberg, 244 Fed. 209, 213 (W.D. Mo. 1914). (The residence requirement is imposed
"not only as tangible evidence of intent, but in order that petitioner may absorb the
spirit of our institutions and do his part in the discharge of reciprocal obligations.")
12. 20 F.2d 146 (M.D. N.C. 1927).
13. Id. at 147.
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family. These factors indicate a willingness or lack of willingness to
''pull up stakes" and to make a sharp break from the applicant's prior
residence. In Petition of Correa,4 a Mexican citizen had a job for the
five year period as a waiter in El Paso, and lived in a small unfurnished
apartment in that city. He left his family and most of his personal
property in Juarez, Mexico, right across the border. The house in which
his family lived in Juarez was the only one he owned. In ruling that
Correa had not established a "domicile" in the United States, the court
emphasized these facts in addition to the fact that he spent at least half
his time in Juarez when not working in El Paso. However, it was not
alleged that he had not been physically present enough of the time in
the United States.
In addition, the opinion of the court indicated one interest of United
States citizens which a judge more or less unconsciously might try to
protect in the course of applying this requirement to the fact situations.
The interest protected here seemed to be essentially an economic one-that
of preventing money earned in the United States from being regularly
spent outside the United States.15
Where the question is not the establishment of a residence, but
whether the applicant has in fact abandoned his residence in the United
States, the emphasis shifts to the question of the voluntariness of the
absence. Whether or not it was necessary for the applicant to be out of
this country for an extended period of time indicates his willingness to
share the burdens with the benefits of United States citizenship. This
problem arises only after an extended absence of from six months to a
year. After such an absence, under the present act, the petitioner must
rebut the presumption that his residence has been abandoned. Petition
of Schneider,6 decided in 1927, is a good example. That case concerned
two applicants; one was granted citizenship (Schneider), and the other
was denied it (Penalosa). Both were absent for a little over two years.
Both retained their apartments in the United States. Both took their
families with them. Penalosa represented an American company in
Venezuela; Schneider stayed with his ill mother until she died. The court
14. See note 7 supra.
15. "It was not the intent of Congress and is not the intent of the law to admit a
person to citizenship who lives here in order to obtain better wages or improve his
financial condition and at the same time raise and maintain a family, educate his chil-
dren, buy his home and spend his money in a foreign country. This would be a dan-
gerous and unwise precedent that would encourage countless foreigners to file applica-
tions without assuming the duties and responsibilities of American citizenship." Peti-
tion of Correa, 79 F. Supp. 265, 268 (W.D. Tex. 1948). As other courts have stated,
American citizenship cannot be put on and off like a cloak, merely for the purpose of
economic gain.
16. 19 F.2d 404 (S.D. N.Y. 1927).
NOTES
stated that Schneider was compelled by unforeseen events to extend his
visit, "and may be said in some sense to have been there only from day to
day, ready at any time to return to his apartment in New York when the
family situation warranted. . . . Penalosa's stay, on the other hand,
was not only deliberate, but was doubtless intended to be for an extended
period, while he was engaged in directing the affairs of the bank in
Venezuela.""7
* The preceding cases indicate the positive role taken by the courts
prior to 1952 in the implementation of the policy of the statute. In the
past, the examination of petitioner's "intent," and the determination as
to his "good faith," enabled the courts to exercise much discretion.
However, as has been mentioned earlier, Congress redefined "residence"
in the new act to mean a "place of general abode," and "the place of
general abode of a person means his principal, actual dwelling place in
fact, without regard to intent."1 The new definition must be examined
in order to determine its effect on the traditional role of the courts in
the application of the requirement of "fesidence."
Assuming that the courts were ever truly concerned with determining
domicile, it would certainly seem that residence, as now used, is no longer
synonymous with domicile. Moreover, if intent is ruled out as a factor
altogether, nothing would appear to be left in the determination of
residence but physical presence. Under that interpretation, the petitioner's
purpose in being in one country or another could not be examined, because
it would involve an examination of intent. Some early commentators
felt this to be the only possible interpretation of the new definition, and
concluded that physical presence was the sole test of residence.'9 This
interpretation would mean, however, that any absence from the country
would be a break in the continuity of residence. Such has not been the
case.
The draftsmen's report on this statute contains a significant com-
17. Id. at 406. The difference in result between Penalosa's petition and that of
Yatsevitch, which was based on essentially the same fact situation, can only be ex-
plained by the fact that a test of domicile was applied to Yatsevitch. Penalosa's peti-
tion was turned down under a test of "residence."
18. 66 Stat. 170, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(33) (1952).
19. Gordon, Continuous Residence, 53 COLUm. L. REv. 451, 454 (1953). Mr. Gor-
don cites one case, Barber v. Valetta, 199 F.2d 419 (9th Cir. 1952), which he says in-
terpreted "actual residence" (the terminology used by the Savorgnan Court) as physical
presence. However, this is misleading. The contention in that case was that petitioner's
entry was not legal, and that therefore no residence, of any kind, could follow, "actual"
or otherwise. The court stated: "We think, however, that the words 'actually resided'
must be held to have been used in this section as referring to physical presence within
the United States as distinguished from a lawful domicile or dwelling therein." (Em-
phasis added.) Id. at 422. The word "actual" "distinguishes that which really and in
fact occurred from that which might be described as a legal or lawful condition." Ibid.
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ment on this section: "This definition is a codification of judicial con-
structions of the term 'residence' as expressed by the Supreme Court of
the United States in Savorgnan v. United States, 338 U.S. 491, 505
(1950)."2" In that case, the petitioner brought an action for a judgment
declaring her to be an American citizen. Five years before, in order to
marry a member of the Italian foreign service, she had signed an official
Italian form in which she knowingly renounced her American citizenship.
She lived with her husband in Italy for the next five years. The question,
under the statute, was whether her residence had shifted to Italy for the
period she was there. Mrs. Savorgnan claimed, and the District Court
so found, that when she went to Italy to live with her husband, "she did
so without any intention of establishing a permanent residence abroad or
abandoning her residence in the United States, or of divesting herself of
her American citizenship."
However, the Supreme Court held these facts to be immaterial.
"Her intent as to her 'domicile' or as to her 'permanent residence,' as
distinguished from her actual 'residence,' 'principal dwelling place,' and
'place of abode,' is not material." (Emphasis added.) The Court's state-
ment that the "new [1940] Act used the term 'residence' as plainly as
possible to denote an objective fact" is often quoted and has led to the
belief that the Court intended to make a broad and unqualified exclusion
of intent as an element of residence.2 ' However, the full sentence should
be considered before determining whether all intent or only certain kinds
of intent were meant to be excluded: "In contrast to such terms as:
. 'domicile,' . . . the new act used the term 'residence' as plainly
as possible to denote an objective fact." The court explained: "Where
'permanent residence' was intended, the statute used that term."22
It seems clear that the intent which is to be disregarded is a particular
kind of intent, one that is limited in scope to the facts of that case. There
were two kinds of intent at issue in the Savorgnn case and the Supreme
Court held neither to be an element of residence. First was "domiciliary"
intent-intent for permanent or indefinite residence. Second was the
party's intent as to the legal consequence of his acts. It was found that
Mrs. Savorgnan did not intend to abandon her residence in the United
States nor divest herself "of her American citizenship." Her intent was
to these matters, as well as whether or not she intended to establish a
permanent residence in Italy, was held by the Supreme Court not to be
20. S. Rep. No. 1137, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1952).
21. Grauert v. DuIles, 133 F. Supp. 836 (D.D.C. 1955).
22. Id. at 504-05.
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material in deciding whether she had actually resided in Italy for the
period she had been there."3
It has long been held that a person's intent as to the legal result
of his action' is not niaterial in determining domicile or residence. There-
fore, the most significant part of this case is the express revocation of
"domiciliary intent" as material to the determination of residence for
naturalization. However, as will be shown, the case does not stand for
the proposition that all inquiry into the subjective state of the petitioner's
mind is to be avoided.
The cases that follow Savorgnon generally limit its holding to
ruling out domiciliary intent as a factor in determining residence, without
excluding an examination of petitioner's present intention, as indicated
by extrinsic evidence. They also seem to indicate that the statutory
definition taken from the case, although phrased in broad, unqualified
language, will likewise be construed in a narrow manner. These later
cases in the main involve expatriation as a result of "continuous resi-
dence" 'abroad rather than naturalization based on residence in this
country. However, these cases deal with the same test of (three or five
years of) "continuous residence" and the same statutory definition taken
from the Savorgnan case.2 Therefore, their treatment and discussion of
the statutory definition and its relation to the Savorgnan case indicate
the attitude of the courts toward the broad language of the new definition,
and whether or not the courts will, as noted in the draftsmen's reference
to the Savorgnan case, interpret the definition in the light of that case.
One of the first cases to deal with the Savorgnan definition of resi-
dence was Toy Teung Kwong v. Acheson.25 In that case, the petitioner
was a national of the United States if his father had had ten years of
"continuous residence" within the United States. The father's period of
residence began in 1938, but in 1946 he returned to China, where he re-
mained until his return to the United States in 1949. The government
argued that under the Savorguan test, residence was purely objective, and
that therefore his residence was in China for the three years he "lived"
there. If this were true, the absence would have broken the continuity
23. The facts of the case can be construed so as to support the conclusion that the
only things ruled out by the court were self-serving statements of domiciliary intent,
such as Mrs. Savorgnan's. This would leave the Service free to argue against naturali-
zation of a petitioner on the basis of his negative domiciliary intent-an intent always to
return to his native country.
24. As was stated in Caolo v. Dulles, 115 F. Supp. 125 (D.C. P.R. 1953), concern-
ing the 1952 Immigration Act: "It is elementary in statutory construction that words
used in certain sections of a statute and by it given a specified meaning must be deemed
to have the same meaning when employed in other. sections of the statute . .
25. 97 F. Supp. 745 (N.D. Cal. 1951). .
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of the period of residence in the United States. The court said: "Intent
is ruled out as a factor." But, as to the test of principal dwelling place:
"Implicit in the word 'principal' is a recognition of factual gradations
ranging between a transient 'one night stand' and a situation such as
existed in the cited case [Savorgnan] (where the petitioner actually had
no other residence, had severed all ties, and had settled down with her
husband in Italy). The court's [in Savorgnan] use of 'actual residence'
must be viewed from that perspective rather than that contended for by
the government in the immediate case. . . . His visit to China was
merely for the purpose of attending his mother in her illness."26 There-
fore, he was a resident of the United States during the time spent living
in China.27
This is the first indication given by the courts that they are going to
continue to look for the same subjective factors they have always sought.
However, their conclusions will have to be expressed in language dif-
ferent from that used prior to the 1952 definition. This court did give
a slight bow in the direction of Congress and the new definition by
saying: "Intent is ruled out as a factor." However, in spite of the fact
that Toy Teung Kwong's intent was not material, it was decided that he
was "residing" in the United States for a three year period in which
he lived (with his ill mother) in China.
The second important case in which the Savorgizan definition was
discussed is United States v. Karahalias.2s The petitioner asked for the
reversal of a prior expatriation order, claiming that he was compelled
under the circumstances to stay in his native country because of his wife's
illness. In granting petitioner's request, Judge Learned Hand commented
on the Savorgnan case: "There can of course be no doubt that by all this
the Court meant to exclude 'intent,' in the sense that the word is a factor
in determining domicile."2 He went on to say, however, that the court
must look to the purposes and surrounding circumstances of the person's
stay, even if that means including some evidence of the intentions of the
petitioner.
26. Id. at 746-47.
27. This is one of the cases described in Grauert v. Dulles, 133 F. Supp. 836 (D.
D.C. 1955), as a deviation from the Savorgnan holding. The court does not explain this
questionable conclusion. One other case cited as a deviation from the Savorglian rule,
in Grauert v. Dulles, might be a more accurate designation. In that case, the father left
during the tenth year, and the judge in giving his conclusions stated as follows: "I
further conclude . . . that such residence was never intended by Lee You [the father]
to be any other place than in the United States. Lee You v. Acheson, 109 F. Supp.
98 (S.D. Tex. 1952).
28. 205 F.2d 331 (2d Cir. 1953).
29. Id. at 335.
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Thus one year after the passage of the Act, we find the courts
limiting the legislative exclusion of "intent" to "domiciliary intent."
Obviously, the courts can thereby justify examining all evidence of the
purpose and surrounding circustances of the.person's stay as indicative
of his "present" intent to reside at one locale or another.
In 1957, the significant case of Garlasco v. Dulles" resumed dis-
cussion of the Savorgnan, test. This was an expatriation case in which
the government contended that Garlasco "continually resided" in Italy
for three years, thereby losing his United States citizenship. However,
during this three year period of alleged "continual residence" in Italy,
he did return to the United States for two and one half months. The
government attempted to show'that although physically present in the
United States, his intent was to return to Italy shortly, and not to reside
here. It was proved that less than one month after his arrival, he applied
for a passport to return to Italy. The District Court said that his intent
was immaterial and that the presumption was that a person's residence
went with physical presence. It was further held that the presumption
was not rebutted by proof that Garlasco intended to return to Italy shortly.
Therefore, the continuity of Garlasco's residence abroad was broken by
his trip to the United States and he did not lose his citizenship.
On appeal to the Second Circuit Court, the government altered
slightly the presentation of its argument that this evidence should be
considered. The United States contended that. this evidence indicated
that in Garlasco's mind, he had one "place of general abode" for the three
year period-Italy. The Court of Appeals agreed that evidence of his
intent to return to Italy, when the reason for its importance is phrased
in this manner, would be relevant. This would seem to mean that the
trial court erred in not considering the evidence of Garlasco's intent and
that the government should win its appeal for a reversal. However, -
intent, at least in one sense of the word-"domiciliary intent"-has been
rendered immaterial by the new definition. Thus, the appellate court
assumed that the trial judge meant "domiciliary intent" when he made
the unqualified statement that intent is immaterial, and affirmed the de-
cision of the trial court. In the words of the appellate court, if the trial
judge was thinking of intent in terms of "domiciliary intent" or "intent
to reside at a place indefinitely," he was correct in ruling it immaterial.
However, "the Court's statement might have gone more fully into the
sense in which intent was held to be immaterial." For, "the overt act of
maintaining a place of general abode would naturally . . .have in it some
subjective element of purpose of staying at the place even under the 1952
30. 243 F.2d 679 (7th Cir. 1957).
589
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Act."31 (Emphasis added.) Judge Medina, in dissenting from the ma-
jority's interpretation of the District Judge's use of the word "intent,"
said that he felt that "principal dwelling place . . . necessarily involves
a probing of his [Garlasco's] intention, and the cases so hold." 2
This case shows a court wrestling with the word "intent" and its
inherent ambiguity. Its conclusion is that the courts are not required by
the 1952 definition to change their traditional approach to the determina-
tion of "residence."
Thus the role of the courts does not appear to have been appreciably
changed by the "radically-new" definition in the 1952 Act. The cases
decided before 1952 indicate that much freedom was given to the courts
in the examination of factors toward the determination of "residence."
Even the test of "domicile" took on new implications when the courts
were using it to determine naturalization. When the issue became the
establishment of a "residence," the courts' analysis generally concerned
itself with the "sufficiency" of petitioner's presence in the United States.
When the issue was loss of residence for absence, the voluntariness of
the absence-petitioner's purpose in being abroad-was the determinative
factor and included a probing into his subjective attitude of "good faith."
The courts strongly indicate that the method of analysis has not changed,
although the rationale of the opinions will hereafter be expressed in a
different terminology in order to conform to the new statutory defini-
tion. The desired characteristic of a willingness to accept the burdens
of citizenship with its benefits will tend to indicate the party's "principal
dwelling place," without being expressed in terms of "domiciliary intent"
or "intent to reside." There is no indication that the scope of the courts'
analysis, which has always been aimed at the implementation of the
statutory policy, has been restricted in any way by the legislative prohibi-
tion of the consideration of intent as an element of residence.
31. Id. at 681.
32. Id. at 682. There is another case, Chien Fan Chu v. Brownell, 247 F.2d 790
(D.C. Cir. 1957), which indicates the statutory definition will be interpreted to har-
monize with the Savorgitan case. In this case, petitioner was detained at Formosa for
a matter of months before he could get into the United States. The 1952 Act definition
was applied, although "residence" in another part of the act was involved, and it was
determined, under the new definition, even with the broad exclusion of "intent," that
petitioner was a mere sojourner on Formosa and therefore did not establish "residence"
there.
